Capacity Constraint, Price Discrimination, and Oligopoly

In the presence of market power in oligopolistic environment, price discrimination is a natural phenomenon. Surprisingly this setting has not been analyzed in depth in the literature. In contrast with existing literature, e.g., Hazledine (2006) and Kutlu (2009), we consider quantity setting games where firms compete in two stages. In the first stage firms decide on the choice of capacity and in the second stage they decide on the structure of price discrimination where the level of price discrimination is exogenous. In contrast to Hazledine (2006) we find that in the Cournot framework the quantity-weighted average price depends on the level of price discrimination. We also find that in the Stackelberg framework both the leader and the follower price discriminate as opposed to Kutlu (2009) which concludes that the leader doesn't price discriminate. Moreover, it is discovered that both the players (even the follower) prefer to be in the Stackelberg framework rather than the Cournot framework when price discrimination exists. Comparing welfare under various settings, it is found that competition is not always good for the total welfare if price discrimination exists. desirable axioms.

Implementing Efficient Graphs in Connection Networks

We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a network that meets the connection demands of a set of agents. The agents simultaneously choose paths in the network connecting their demand nodes. A mechanism splits the total cost of the network formed among the participants. We introduce two new properties of implementation. The first prop- erty, Pareto Nash Implementation (PNI), requires that the efficient out- come is always implemented in a Nash equilibrium, and that the efficient outcome Pareto dominates any other Nash equilibrium. The average cost mechanism (AC) and other assymetric variations, are the only rules that meet PNI. These mechanisms are also characterized under Strong Nash Implementation. The second property, Weakly Pareto Nash Implementation (WPNI), requires that the least inefficient equilibrium Pareto dominate any other equilibrium. The egalitarian mechanism (EG), a variation of AC that meets individual rationality, and other assymetric mechanisms are the only rules that meet WPNI and Individual Rationality. PNI and WPNI provide the first economic justification of the Price of Stability (PoS), a seemingly natural measure in the computer science literature but not easily embraced in economics. EG minimizes the PoS across all individually rational mechanisms.ntable SCFs in our environment if we add a few desirable axioms.

Implementing Efficient Graphs in Connection Networks

We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a network that meets the connection demands of a set of agents. The agents simultaneously choose paths in the network connecting their demand nodes. A mechanism splits the total cost of the network formed among the participants. We introduce two new properties of implementation. The first property, Pareto Nash Implementation (PNI), requires that the efficient outcome is always implemented in a Nash equilibrium, and that the efficient outcome Pareto dominates any other Nash equilibrium. The average cost mechanism (AC) and other asymmetric variations, are the only rules that meet PNI. These mechanisms are also characterized under Strong Nash Implementation. The second property, Weakly Pareto Nash Implementation (WPNI), requires that the least inefficient equilibrium Pareto dominate any other equilibrium. The egalitarian mechanism (EG), a variation of AC that meets individual rationality, and other asymmetric mechanisms are the only rules that meet WPNI and Individual Rationality. PNI and WPNI provide the first economic justification of the Price of Stability (PoS), a seemingly natural measure in the computer science literature but not easily embraced in economics. EG minimizes the PoS across all individually rational mechanisms.Cost-sharing, Implementation, Average Cost, Egalitarian Mechanism.

System requirements and design features of Space Station Remote Manipulator System mechanisms

The Space Station Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS) is a long robotic arm for handling large objects/payloads on the International Space Station Freedom. The mechanical components of the SSRMS include seven joints, two latching end effectors (LEEs), and two boom assemblies. The joints and LEEs are complex aerospace mechanisms. The system requirements and design features of these mechanisms are presented. All seven joints of the SSRMS have identical functional performance. The two LEES are identical. This feature allows either end of the SSRMS to be used as tip or base. As compared to the end effector of the Shuttle Remote Manipulator System, the LEE has a latch and umbilical mechanism in addition to the snare and rigidize mechanisms. The latches increase the interface preload and allow large payloads (up to 116,000 Kg) to be handled. The umbilical connectors provide power, data, and video signal transfer capability to/from the SSRMS

An Online English Auction Scheme

Online English auction is most familiar and mostly used online auction process in the present scenario. It is the most efficient auction process which gives most desirable results in terms of revenue . Our scheme involves three parties, namely the Registration Manager(RM), Auction Manager(AM), and Bidder(B). The Registration Manager publicizes the parameters to register the bidders, allowing them to participate in the bidding process. It also protects the bidding rights and manages the information on the key. The Auction Manager is responsible for conducting the bidding after the registration is over. Our proposed scheme satisfies the following features such as anonymity, no framing, unforgeability, non-repudiation, fairness, public verifiability, one-time registration, and easy revocation. The scheme uses Discrete Logarithmic Problem (DLP) and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) as hash function

Online English Auction Scheme

Online English auction is most familiar and mostly used online auction process in the present scenario. It is the most efficient auction process which gives most desirable results in terms of revenue. Our scheme involves three parties, namely the Registration Manager(RM), Auction Manager(AM), and Bidder(B). The Registration Manager publicizes the parameters to register the bidders, allowing them to participate in the bidding process. It also protects the bidding rights and manages the information on the key. The Auction Manager is responsible for conducting the bidding after the registration is over. Our proposed scheme satisfies the following features such as anonymity, no framing, unforgeability, non-repudiation, fairness, public verifiability, one-time registration, and easy revocation. The scheme uses Discrete Logarithmic Problem (DLP) and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) as hash function

Online English Auction Scheme

Online English auction is most familiar and mostly used online auction process in the present scenario. It is the most efficient auction process which gives most desirable results in terms of revenue. Our scheme involves three parties, namely the Registration Manager(RM), Auction Manager(AM), and Bidder(B). The Registration Manager publicizes the parameters to register the bidders, allowing them to participate in the bidding process. It also protects the bidding rights and manages the information on the key. The Auction Manager is responsible for conducting the bidding after the registration is over. Our proposed scheme satisfies the following features such as anonymity, no framing, unforgeability, non-repudiation, fairness, public verifiability, one-time registration, and easy revocation. The scheme uses Discrete Logarithmic Problem (DLP) and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) as hash function

Scare of Avian Flu Revisits India: A Bumpy Road Ahead

With the threat of an avian flu pandemic once again looming over eastern India, issues regarding patents and affordability and accessibility of drugs have taken center stage. The key priority of India should be to remain prepared to address the public health crisis effectively, by stockpiling the drug tamiflu so that it can be easily distributed and administered to the needy.India had been confronted with a serious threat of avian flu in 2005-06, but past experience shows that, despite having some of the broadest and most comprehensive compulsory patent licensing laws, India's policymaking elite shied away from fully exploiting these legal 'flexibilities.' Fortunately, the danger of avian flu did not turn into a substantial public health crisis that year. Under this backdrop, this paper explores various ‘flexibilities’ available in the Indian patent law and suggests short term and long term strategies to effectively tackle the impending danger of an avian flu pandemic, and similar public health crises in future. This paper will discuss potential areas of conflict between the indigenous generic drug firms and the multi-national companies with respect to TRIPS compliance in the event that these flexibilities are exploited. This paper also highlights the administrative constraints and the economic viability of the compulsory licensing system. Finally, this paper shows how political will is often more critical than having well documented provisions in statute books to respond to such situations effectively